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PART 1: GENERAL PUBLIC
HEALTH ETHICS FRAMEWORK
Public health as an organized disci-
pline began more than 100 years ago to
improve the health, primarily, of popula-
tions rather than of individuals. Given its
population-based focus, however, public
health is forever facing dilemmas concern-
ing the appropriate extent of its reach and
when the work of public health profession-
als is infringing on individual liberties in
ethically troublesome ways. Nonetheless,
there have been few attempts to articulate
an ethics of public health, despite the disci-
pline’s long and impressive history.
Bioethics, as a discipline, helps health care
professionals identify and respond to moral
dilemmas in their work. This paper sug-
gests that the contexts out of which
bioethics emerged —medical care and
human research — were oriented to a dif-
ferent set of concerns than those typically
occurring in public health. While the
founders of bioethics articulated principles
equally relevant for public health, the more
specific action guides and codes of health
care ethics that have followed are an
imperfect fit for public health. Codes of
medical and research ethics generally give
high priority to individual autonomy, a pri-
ority that cannot be assumed to be appro-
priate for public health practice. A frame-
work of ethics analysis geared specifically
for public health is needed, both to provide
practical guidance for public health profes-
sionals and also to highlight the defining
values of public health, values that differ in
morally relevant ways from values that
define clinical practice and research.Afirst
attempt at such a framework is offered
here.
PUBLIC HEALTH
Public health is the societal approach
to protecting and promoting health.
Generally through social, rather than indi-
vidual, actions, public health seeks to
improve the well being of communities.
By maintaining a safe water supply,
immunizing school children, or engaging
in epidemiologic research, public health
seeks to ensure societal conditions under
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minimizing threats to our health “that can
be averted or lessened only through col-
lective actions aimed at the community”
[1]. The providers of public health inter-
ventions often are governments, rather
than private practitioners. Indeed, the pro-
vision of health services, generally the
domain of medicine, becomes the respon-
sibility of public health departments when
provided by public clinics or hospitals.
Public health interventions date back
more than three centuries. In 1701,
Massachusetts passed laws for isolation of
smallpox patients and for ship quarantine
[1]. In the early 1800s, Edward Chadwick
demonstrated in England that differences
in social conditions led to a more than
twofold difference in life expectancy
between upper and lower classes. Also in
the 1800s, Lemuel Shattuck implemented
in Massachusetts the first system of vital
health statistics [2]. Governments began
conducting investigations of housing con-
ditions and garbage heaps and mapping
them in relation to outbreaks of disease
[2], and by the end of the 19th century,
state and local boards of health were being
created to enforce sanitary regulations [1].
By the early 20th century, public health
was seen as cost effective as well as useful
[2], and more money was directed to pub-
lic health programs. During World War II,
given the need for a healthy population for
the military, the Public Health Service
established the Center for Controlling
Malaria in the WarAreas, later the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.
Epidemiology developed as the science of
public health, to study “the distribution
and determinants of health-related states
and events in specified populations and [to
apply this knowledge] to the control of
health problems” [3].
Today, public health practitioners use
tools in addition to epidemiology to
accomplish their work, still focusing pri-
marily on community-wide, typically
prospective, approaches to improve
health. Some public health functions —
surveillance, vital statistics, disease and
injury reporting, and disease registries —
relate to epidemiology and the collection
of data. In addition, practitioners investi-
gate outbreaks, conduct contact tracing,
provide health education and other pre-
ventive interventions, and conduct
research related to public health. Last,
public health professionals sometimes cre-
ate or enforce health related regulations
and legislation — for example, mandating
screening, treatment, immunizations, or,
rarely, quarantine. States’authority to pass
laws to improve the public’s health dates
to the 19th century and is referred to as the
“police power,” “coercive action under
state authority … to encourage education-
al efforts … or to seize property, close
businesses, destroy animals, or involuntar-
ily treat or even lock away individuals”
[4]. These various public health tools and
functions, while together successful in
decreasing morbidity and mortality,
nonetheless raise questions of ethics in
terms of the means by which their suc-
cesses are achieved.
BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Bioethics helps health professionals
and public-policy makers recognize moral
dilemmas in health care and biomedical
research and provides principles and
moral rules to navigate through these
dilemmas [5]. Dating to the 1960s and
1970s, bioethics grew out of questions of
fairness in resource allocation, moral
issues raised by new technologies, and a
lack of oversight in human subjects
research. The public was swept up in
debate about whether the first artificial
kidney center should allocate scarce
resources based on social criteria, and
whether Karen Ann Quinlan should be
kept alive artificially when she had no
meaningful cognition. In 1969, the
Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life
Sciences (now the Hastings Center) was
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and to provide frameworks by which to
analyze contemporary moral dilemmas in
medicine and science [6]. In 1974, after
several reports of United States govern-
ment sponsored research that compro-
mised the rights and welfare of study sub-
jects, a new national commission issued
the Belmont Report [7], which included
ethics principles to guide the conduct of
human subjects research — beneficence,
respect for persons, and justice. Early
framers of bioethics elaborated on these
principles and provided examples of how
they were useful in analyzing dilemmas
from other areas of health care, not just
research [8].
These early framers argued that, a pri-
ori, no principle ought to have moral supe-
riority over any other. At the same time,
the issues that animated bioethics in the
early years — the need to tell patients and
research subjects the truth, the right to
refusal of care or research participation —
were ones where the principle of respect
for autonomy, perhaps given too little
moral attention previously, was now given
preeminent moral status [9-11]. Informed
consent, a practical application of the
autonomy principle, became a hallmark of
the new bioethics, and codes of ethics for
clinical practice, while still emphasizing
the need not to harm the patient, added
clauses requiring physicians to “best pro-
tect the dignity of man in patients or
research subjects” [12].
That contemporary medical ethics or
research codes have made the right to non-
interference central, given the context out
of which they emerged, is understandable.
That public health practitioners, lacking
guidelines of their own, must turn to these
same codes for professional moral direc-
tion, however, is more problematic. In rare
instances, existing medical or research
codes do discuss traditional public health
functions, such as breaching patient confi-
dentiality to report diseases to the state
[13]. In such instances, however, the
physician’s behavior is presented as an
allowable exception to usual ethics rules,
in the name of public health. At best, this
leaves public health professionals needing
to muddle through most other situations on
their own; at worst, it could lead them, or
even the public, to assume that public
health is the branch of health care sanc-
tioned by bioethics to make exceptions to
existing ethics rules at will, in the name of
public health and safety. Indeed, it is in
great part because such power is vested in
public health by law to safeguard health
that a code or framework of ethics,
designed specifically for public health, is
so very important. The need for a code of
ethics for public health, then, might be
viewed as a code of restraint, a code to
preserve fairly and appropriately negative
rights of citizens to non-interference.
A code or framework of public health
ethics must emphasize positive rights as
well, however. Public health has affirma-
tive obligations to improve the public’s
health and, arguably, to reduce certain
social inequities. A framework of public
health ethics is needed to address such
social justice functions of public health as
well. While frameworks have been put
forward in medicine to help clinicians
think through the ethical issues in a clini-
cal case [14, 15], no analogous framework
is available for public health practitioners.
We live in a morally pluralistic soci-
ety, and it is inevitable that moral appeals
will conflict when trying to determine
appropriate public policy. An attempt at a
framework for public health ethics is
offered here to help public health profes-
sionals recognize the multiple and varied
moral issues in their work and consider
means of responding to them.
AN ETHICS FRAMEWORK FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH
A six-step framework for public
health is proposed for consideration [16].
This is not a code of professional ethics,
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norms and expectations of professional
behavior and likely would be the product
of a professional society. Rather, this six-
part framework is an analytic tool,
designed to help public health profession-
als consider the ethics implications of pro-
posed programs, interventions, research
initiatives, and policy proposals.
1. What are the public health goals of
the proposed intervention, policy, or
program?
The first step for any proposed public
health program is to identify what are the
program’s goals. These goals generally
ought to be expressed in terms of public
health improvement, that is, in terms of
reduction of morbidity or mortality. For
example, an HIV screening program
should have as its ultimate goal fewer inci-
dent cases of HIV, not simply that a certain
proportion of individuals will agree to be
tested. A health education program in car-
diac risk reduction should have as its ulti-
mate goal, or be a piece of a larger pro-
gram with the ultimate goal, that individu-
als will have fewer heart attacks, not sim-
ply that individuals will learn new infor-
mation or even that they will change their
behavior. A research study should have as
its goal, or be a piece of a trajectory with
the goal, that findings, if positive, will be
implemented with the target population
and improve its health status. While more
proximate and process goals (such as
whether individuals will learn health
information or whether they will agree to
be tested) are a critical piece of program
planning and evaluation, and may be cru-
cial steps to achieving health improve-
ment, the fundamental goal of decreased
morbidity and mortality is the outcome by
which the program or series of programs
ultimately must be assessed. This is not to
say that each individual program or
research study must achieve this end.
Epidemiologic studies may provide
descriptive data that lead scientists years
later to develop an intervention that will
lead to a reduction in morbidity or mortal-
ity; a health education program may be
one of multiple and varied interventions
that together reduce risks and ill health.
The argument put forth here, however, is
that public health programs, interventions,
or studies must be designed with an aware-
ness of what the relationship is between
this program and an ultimate reduction in
morbidity or mortality.
Of course, other types of benefits,
generally social benefits, can accrue from
public health programs as well. Public
health programs can result in greater
employment, for example, as well as less
tangible benefits, such as coalition build-
ing or the strengthening of communities.
These benefits are extremely important
and should be given strong consideration.
They are, however, either the incidental or
intermediary outcomes of public health
programs rather than programs’final goal.
If a program has as its goal to increase
employment for its own sake (rather than,
for example, to increase employment as a
means to lower psychological morbidity
or as a means to improve socioeconomic
status to lead to improved health), or if a
program has as its ultimate goal to
strengthen communities (rather than to
strengthen communities as a means to
decrease interpersonal violence or as a
means to help watch out for the well-being
of the young or old persons in the commu-
nity), then the program primarily is a
social program, not one of public health.
As described further below, a reduction in
morbidity and mortality need not nor
could not be the goal of every individual
public health intervention or program;
individual public health programs, howev-
er, should not be undertaken that are not
part of a larger package of programs
whose combined goal is the reduction of
morbidity and mortality.
According to this view, an interven-
tion whose goal is to improve access to
care among hard-to-reach populations has
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assuming, of course, the program is effec-
tive in improving access. Other examples
of interventions designed to reduce social
inequalities will be discussed further in
Step 5.
Also relevant when considering pub-
lic health goals and benefits is to whom
the benefit will accrue. Public health inter-
ventions often are targeted to one set of
individuals in order to protect other citi-
zens’ health. Partner notification programs
or directly observed therapy for tuberculo-
sis are designed, primarily, to protect citi-
zens from the health threats posed by oth-
ers. In some contexts, public health pro-
grams are designed, primarily, to protect
individuals from themselves, revealing
that much of public health is inherently
and unabashedly paternalistic. Health edu-
cation campaigns, blood pressure screen-
ing, seat belt laws, and 55 mph speed lim-
its, while motivated in part by social con-
cerns about costs are, I suggest, motivated
primarily to further individuals’ ability to
protect their own health. Restricting some-
one’s liberty to protect him or herself, or
restricting liberty to protect a different per-
son, pose different ethical burdens, dis-
cussed further in Step 3.
2. How effective is the intervention,
policy, or program in achieving its stat-
ed goals?
Proposed interventions or programs
are based on certain assumptions that lead
us to believe the programs will achieve
their stated goals. Step 2 asks us to exam-
ine what those assumptions are, and what
data exist to substantiate each of them.The
cardiac risk-reduction program would
have as its ultimate goal to reduce fatal
and nonfatal cardiac events. The assump-
tions of this education program (or the
larger effort of which it is a piece) are that
the program will reach individuals at risk
of cardiac events; those individuals will
learn the risk reduction messages; individ-
uals will change their behavior (e.g., stop
smoking, change diets, or increase exer-
cise) in ways suggested by the program;
these changes would not have occurred
without the program; and the behavior
change in itself will result in fewer cardiac
events. While many health education pro-
grams are very effective at transmitting
information that recipients learn and
understand, programs generally are less
successful at inducing behavior change
[17, 18]. Thus, while a rather narrow eval-
uation may demonstrate success (in terms
of participants understanding the message)
a program ultimately cannot claim success
if behavior is unaffected, and morbidity
and mortality rates remain unchanged.
This is not to suggest that each pro-
gram must reduce morbidity by itself.
Individual health education or screening
programs, for example, might be pieces of
larger initiatives to reduce cardiac morbid-
ity and mortality. Data may show that mul-
tiple education campaigns in different for-
mats and with different messages are
required to induce widespread behavior
change. Multi-dimensional efforts are
appropriate and useful, if data show that
the combination is likely to evoke the
desired result. Again, however, if the mul-
tiple approaches are simply hypothesized
or assumed to reduce illness events, then
further research must be done; a public
health program is not yet justified.
This step of examining existing data
in order to challenge our assumptions and
implement only data-based policies or
programs is often neglected in public
health. One can assume that this is not
because professionals are indifferent to
whether their methods relate to their out-
comes but because we simply assume they
do, and we neglect to find data that prove
us right or wrong. Thus, we introduce a
program based on the assumption that
some number of people who learn that cig-
arettes cause asthma and lung cancer will
quit or call for HIV screening assuming
that individuals who learn they are infect-
ed will begin to use condoms in sexual
Kass: An ethics framework for public health 239relationships. It is when our assumptions
seem most intuitively obvious that we are
at greatest risk of neglecting to determine
to what extent they are supported by real
evidence.
While all programs must be based on
sound data rather than informed specula-
tion, the quality and volume of existing
data will vary. The question for policy and
ethics analysis, then, is how much data is
enough to justify a program’s implementa-
tion? As a rule of thumb, the greater the
burdens posed by a program — for exam-
ple, in terms of cost, constraints on liberty,
or targeting particular, already vulnerable
segments of the population — the stronger
the evidence must be to demonstrate that
the program will achieve its goals. Indeed,
because many public health programs are
imposed on people by governments and
not sought out by citizens, the burden of
proof lies with governments or public
health practitioners to prove that the pro-
gram will achieve its goals. Thus, if at
least some data do not exist to demonstrate
the validity of a program’s assumptions,
the analysis can stop right here, and, ethi-
cally, the program should not be imple-
mented. Conversely, the presence of good
data alone does not justify the program; it
allows us to move to the next stage of the
analysis.
3. What are the known or potential bur-
dens of the program?
If data suggest that a program is rea-
sonably likely to achieve its stated goals,
then the third step of the framework asks us
to identify burdens or harms that could
occur through our public health work. Step
4 of the framework, then, will address how
these harms or burdens could be mini-
mized, and Step 6 will address how to bal-
ance expected benefits against expected
burdens. While a variety of burdens or
harms might exist in public health pro-
grams, the majority of burdens will fall into
three broad types: Risks to privacy and con-
fidentiality, especially in data collection
activities; risks to liberty and self-determi-
nation, given the power accorded public
health to enact almost any measure neces-
sary to contain disease; and risks to justice,
if public health practitioners propose target-
ing public health interventions only to cer-
tain groups. Different types of burdens are
more or less likely to result from different
types of public health activities.
Disease surveillance and vital statis-
tics, designed to monitor health and popu-
lation trends, raise potential privacy con-
cerns, especially since data collection is
mandatory, data often are individually
identifiable, and, in many cases, are pub-
licly available. While the data collected
are not considered very personal nor sensi-
tive by most persons, everyone has his or
her own “boundary of privacy.” Further,
for some individuals, particular elements
of vital statistics such as paternity or cause
of death could be seen as troubling inva-
sions of their privacy. Finally, vital statis-
tics and other publicly collected data can
reveal patterns about ethnic groups or
neighborhoods that may be stigmatizing or
otherwise harmful.
Communicable disease reporting rais-
es privacy concerns as well, but the
infringement and risks potentially are
greater, since names are reported only of
those who have reportable (and often
socially stigmatizing) conditions. Given
that individuals typically want the ability
to control whether and to whom private
information is disclosed, disease reporting
carries the additional risk of a breach of
confidentiality if security measures are not
followed or do not work. For some, there
is a risk of privacy infringement only to
the extent that confidentiality is not main-
tained, and harms such as social stigma or
loss of employment ensue from unwar-
ranted disclosure. For others, the privacy
infringement is viewed as a wrong in
itself, regardless of whether any tangible
harm ensues.
Disease reporting is an example of a
public health function that at least on its
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burdens of the program are borne by those
with the disease, generally for the benefit
of others who do not have the disease.This
unevenness of burdens and benefits,
(described below) may be justified in cer-
tain instances, when the benefits are
important, and when there are no less bur-
densome ways to achieve them.
Unevenness in benefits and burdens is
never appropriate, however, if groups are
burdened in ways that are arbitrary and
without public health justification.
Further, a program that does not target par-
ticular groups explicitly may, in fact, lead
to targeting in its implementation. One
study, for example, suggested that doctors
are more likely to report a patient with
HIV to the health department if the patient
is black and is male [19], despite language
in the statute requiring the reporting of all
persons with HIV. The appropriateness of
creating targeted public health programs
justified by epidemiologic data will be dis-
cussed further in Step 6 below.
Contact tracing, which sometimes
accompanies communicable disease
reporting, poses additional privacy risks.
Not only are an individual’s name and
condition reported, but individuals are
asked to provide the names of other (usu-
ally sexual) contacts they have had.
Obviously a privacy infringement in itself,
contact tracing also invades the privacy of
individuals whose names are disclosed,
who could not decide for themselves
whether to release their names to officials.
As stated above, harms can occur if confi-
dentiality protections fail; and individuals
can feel wronged simply by virtue of the
violation of their privacy.As above, justice
concerns also arise if contact tracing pro-
grams are not implemented fairly.
Health education poses interesting
questions in terms of ethics. In certain
ways, health education is the ideal public
health intervention, since it is completely
voluntary, and it seeks to empower people
to make their own autonomous decisions
regarding their health, once equipped with
accurate information. From an ethics per-
spective, education clearly is preferable to
other preventive strategies, to the extent
that they are equally effective, because it
poses few, if any, burdens. Health educa-
tion, however, while an essential compo-
nent of most public health campaigns, will
never be appropriate for all situations.
First and foremost, education may not
work in all settings, and more burdensome
measures may be required. Second, to
increase effectiveness, educational pro-
grams may introduce ethically question-
able practices such as manipulation or
even coercion. A smoking cessation pro-
gram, for example, may try to manipulate
attitudes by suggesting that smokers are
unpopular and providing only partial or
even false information in order to achieve
its ends [20]. All health education cam-
paigns potentially are paternalistic, sug-
gesting that certain ways of being (e.g., in
greater aerobic health) are universally val-
ued.Additional work is needed to examine
when and where paternalism in public
health is justified, especially since bio-
medical ethics generally has steered pro-
fessionals away from paternalism, except
when specifically requested by patients
[21]. Third, health education programs
may target messages to certain audiences.
While, as described above, often justified
on public health grounds (e.g., epidemio-
logic data demonstrate that this is the pop-
ulation at greatest risk, so their pictures
will go on the billboards and messages
will be promoted on the radio stations they
listen to), the social and even public health
ramifications of targeting must be serious-
ly considered. Social stigma can result if,
for example, certain subgroups of the pop-
ulation are assumed to be the ones who
carry sexually transmitted diseases, and
opportunities for public health interven-
tion will be missed entirely if we all come
to believe, through well-intentioned media
campaigns, that only certain groups are at
risk for domestic violence or HIV. Finally,
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accompanied by incentives. Incentives
generally are considered ethically less
problematic than coercive measures or
threats, but even incentives could be ethi-
cally questionable in certain contexts, such
as when financial incentives are given for
using particular types of birth control or
avoiding pregnancy [22].
Public health research
Human subjects regulations already
describe the types of harms that could
occur through research participation.
These include medical risks if the research
is clinical and psychological or social risks
if the research is epidemiological or social
science. In recent years, there has also
been increased attention on the personal
and social burdens that can result from
injustice or exploitation in research when
certain populations are disproportionately
disadvantaged or privileged through
research participation.
In addition to these well articulated
risks, however, is the harm that can come
through public health research findings
never being implemented into public
health policy or practice. Any study that is
conducted imposes, at very least, the bur-
den of inconvenience to those who partic-
ipate and may, of course, pose more sig-
nificant risks to the individuals or commu-
nities who volunteer. An institutional
review board allows research to go for-
ward because of the benefits expected to
emerge from study findings. If research
findings are never translated into policy,
however, — a situation that recurs far too
often — no benefits accrue from the
research. In such instances, participants
were wronged through a misleading
(albeit, not deliberately so) informed con-
sent process, and the risk-to-benefit ratio
could rarely be considered favorable.
Regulations and legislation, strictly
speaking, are coercive, since they impose
penalties for noncompliance. As such,
they pose risks to liberty and self-gover-
nance. While many of these measures, like
reduced speed limits, childproof bottles,
and immunizations, have demonstrated
efficacy, they nonetheless are the most
intrusive approach to public health.
Edmund Pellegrino writes,
Involuntary and coercive measures … must
be undertaken with a clear perception of the
dangers they pose to a democratic society:
loss of personal freedom to choose a lifestyle,
dependence upon governments to define val-
ues and concepts of the good life, and the
imposition of cultural homogeneity.
Involuntary measures also assume a benign,
wise, and responsive government — some-
thing history finds singularly rare [11].
While threats to autonomy are the
most obvious threat posed by public health
regulations and legislation, they can, in
some circumstances, be associated with
physical risks, or risks to individuals’
health, as well. Federally approved and
mandated vaccinations carry health risks
to individuals; and widespread spraying to
prevent the spread of mosquito-borne
viruses can cause proximate health prob-
lems to some individuals who inhale the
chemicals. Finally, in this instance as well,
the law can impose by design or inadver-
tently threats to justice if regulations pose
undue burden on particular segments of
society.
4. How can burdens be minimized?
Are there alternative approaches to
achieve the same goals?
This piece of the framework requires
us to minimize burdens, once burdens
have been identified. If Step 3 suggests
that a program or policy carries potential
or actual burdens, we are ethically
required to determine if the program could
be modified in ways that minimized the
burdens, while not greatly reducing the
program’s efficacy. Public health profes-
sionals, for example, when ready to report
a patient’s name and disease to the state,
should inform patients that their names, by
law, must be reported to public health
242 Kass: An ethics framework for public healthauthorities, but that the law also requires
that they be reported confidentially. While
reporting programs are not optional, the
policy is more respectful of patients if
patients are adequately informed. Contact
tracing programs, similarly, pose threats to
privacy and to confidentiality, and yet con-
tact tracing programs, strictly speaking,
are voluntary, in that no sanctions are
imposed on citizens who refuse to cooper-
ate. It is ethically incumbent upon public
health practitioners to inform individuals
sought for contact tracing of their right to
refuse disclosure of names of their part-
ners altogether, as well as of their right to
inform partners themselves, have a known
provider do it, or have partners contacted
by an agent of the state.
If two options exist to address a pub-
lic health problem, it is required, ethically,
to choose the approach that poses fewer
risks to other moral claims such as liberty,
privacy, opportunity, and justice, assuming
benefits are not significantly reduced.
Making this assessment relies on the exis-
tence of sound data. If data show that a
voluntary screening program will test
essentially equal numbers of individuals
as a mandatory one, because almost no
individuals refuse testing when asked,
then it would be ethically improper to
implement a mandatory program [23]. If
disease surveillance is equally effective
with unique identifiers as with names, a
program of unique identifiers is the moral-
ly preferable choice.
5. Is the program implemented fairly?
This piece of the framework corre-
sponds to the ethics principle of distribu-
tive justice, requiring the fair distribution
of benefits and burdens [8]. Public health
benefits, such as clean water, cannot be
limited to one community alone, nor can a
single population be subject to dispropor-
tionate burdens. HIV screening programs,
for example, cannot be implemented only
in poor or minority communities without
strong justification [24]; cardiac risk
reduction programs cannot be targeted
exclusively to white men, when women
and minorities also are at substantial risk
of heart disease. That programs be imple-
mented fairly is even more important if
restrictive measures are proposed.
Injustice is wrong for its own sake, and
also for the material harms it can evoke.
Social harms result if social stereotypes
are created or perpetuated, such as the
stereotype that only certain segments of
the population are vulnerable to sexually
transmitted diseases. In addition, real pub-
lic health harms result when individuals do
not believe that they are at risk of disease
because they were never targeted in edu-
cation campaigns, or because their own
doctors never screened them for a condi-
tion because they didn’t fit the popular risk
profile [25]. This does not mean that pro-
grams or resources must be allocated
equally to all communities — rather, the
allocations must be fair. That is, differ-
ences cannot be proposed arbitrarily or
based on historical assumptions about who
might be at risk. Rather, again, unequal
distributions of programs must be justified
with strong attention to data. Moreover,
the social consequences must be consid-
ered if communities are allotted resources
unequally, and these must be balanced
against the benefits to that community or
others.
Discussed less frequently is whether
or the degree to which public health has
any explicit role in righting existing injus-
tices, especially given the strong link
between poor living conditions and poor
health outcomes. How much is there a
positive responsibility on the part of pub-
lic health professionals to advocate for
better housing, better jobs, and better
access to food programs, since this might
be the best route to improving the public’s
health? Several notions of justice allow
and even require unequal allocation of
benefits in order to right existing
inequities. John Rawls posits that justice
requires us to allocate our resources
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[26]; Norman Daniels discusses the need
for all members of society to be brought to
a level of “species-typical normal func-
tioning” [27], which also could result in
the unequal distribution of certain
resources.Admittedly, not all philosophers
have adopted this notion of justice, distin-
guishing preexisting societal inequities
that are unfair (because they resulted from
a person or community having been
wronged by an identifiable source) to be
the ones where intervention is owed, from
those inequities that merely are unfortu-
nate (that is, due to acts of God or circum-
stance) where no intervention would be
morally required [28].
Public health, I would argue, does
have this positive responsibility to engage
programs and interventions that seek to
lessen societal inequalities, at very least
where those inequalities (as essentially all
do) relate to health outcomes. Indeed, it is
hard to find a more powerful predictor of
health than class [29, 30], and it is thus an
appropriate, if not obligatory, function of
public health to reduce poverty, substan-
dard housing conditions, and threats to a
meaningful education, to reduce, if for no
other reason, the incidence of disease.
6. How can the public health benefits
and the accompanying burdens be
balanced? What procedures will best
allow for the fair consideration of dif-
fering views?
If it is determined that a proposed
public health intervention, policy, or pro-
gram is likely to achieve its stated goals, if
its potential burdens are recognized and
minimized, and if the program is expected
to be implemented in a nondiscriminatory
way, a decision must be reached about
whether the expected benefits justify the
burdens identified. Recognizing, of
course, that public policy is based on mul-
tiple considerations in addition to ethics,
the question must still be asked whether,
from an ethics perspective, the program
should go forward. Health department
officials and other public health profes-
sionals may not have the power to imple-
ment all programs that they think would be
beneficial, but they do have a responsibil-
ity both to advocate for programs that do
improve health and to remove from policy
debate programs that are unethical, either
because of insufficient data, clearly dis-
criminatory procedures, or unjustified lim-
itations on personal liberties. And yet
while most reasonable people will agree in
the abstract that burdens and benefits must
be balanced, and that the most burden-
some programs can be implemented only
in the context of extensive and important
benefits, disagreements can be all but
guaranteed over the relevant details.
Depending on one’s perspective, there will
be differing views over how burdensome
various programs are, such as having one’s
name reported to the state, or requiring
immunizations before starting school.
Citizens can be expected to differ over
how important it is to protect a water sup-
ply for future generations, particularly if it
means significantly higher taxes or the
prohibition of recreational use of public
bodies of water, clearly a benefit, not only
in terms of individual pleasure, but also in
terms of community cohesiveness.
While disagreements of this nature are
inevitable, decisions must be reached
through a system of fair procedures.
Procedural justice requires a society to
engage in a democratic process to deter-
mine which public health functions it wants
its government to maintain, recognizing
that some liberty infringements and other
burdens are unavoidable. There should be
open discussion of what a society gains
fromgoodpublichealth,andwhysuchben-
efits often cannot be obtained through less
communal or more liberty-preserving
methods. Discussion, of course, also should
address why other interests also have moral
claim. Such a process, even when procedu-
rally fair by most standards, must not result
in decisions based solely on the will of the
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around significantly burdensome proposals,
must be scrutinized to ensure that the views
of the minority are given due consideration.
Highly burdensome programs should be
preceded by public hearings, and not just
votes, so that minority views can be heard
and considered. At the same time, it is
important to acknowledge that there always
will be some number of persons who do not
want their water fluoridated, do not want
their children immunized, do not want to
wear seat belts, and do not want speed lim-
its on public roads. That there is dissent is
insufficient justification for blocking a pub-
lic health program; indeed dissent is
inevitable in all proposals. Dissent must be
considered, however, and deserves special
attention if raised exclusively by a particu-
lar, identified subgroup, such as an ethnic
minority, a particular age group, or resi-
dents of a particular neighborhood.
In balancing values and interests, the
greater the burden imposed by a program,
the greater must be the expected public
health benefit, and the more uneven the
benefits and burdens (that is, burdens are
imposed on one group in order to protect
the health of another), the greater must be
the expected benefit. Programs that are
coercive should be used to a minimum,
should never be implemented when a less
restrictive program would achieve compa-
rable goals, and should be implemented
only in the face of clear public health need
and good data demonstrating effectiveness.
Nonetheless, we are a pluralistic society,
including with regard to our notions of
ethics. Different states and communities
will decide differently which public health
activities are appropriate and which are
overly burdensome. Ultimately, that differ-
ent communities will enact different public
policies, based on their own balancing of
benefits and burdens may be indicative of a
fair process, or at least a pluralistic process,
steering local public health policy.
Of course, public policy is based on
many factors in addition to public health
goals and ethical reasoning. Weighing
alternatives according to this public health
ethics framework should lead to an ethi-
cally acceptable option, but may not lead
to the politically preferable one for a given
time. That politics often takes a divergent
and somewhat unpredictable path is not an
excuse for abandoning ethics analysis
when a public health proposal is up for
discussion, however. Ethics analysis
always must be conducted, both because
bringing truth, fairness, and respect to
one’s work is right in itself, but also
because, from a more utilitarian perspec-
tive, public health work will be more
effective if we do. Engaging in the steps of
an ethics analysis makes us meticulous in
our reasoning, requiring us to advocate for
interventions based on fact and not merely
belief. Further, an ethics analysis holds us
to high standards, not only for scientific
method, but also for how respectfully we
communicate with and involve constituent
communities. The involvement of commu-
nities will help identify the public health
threats divergent groups face and will cre-
ate, if not partnerships, at least, one can
hope, some reasonable trust. In order to
succeed, the field of public health must
garner some reasonable amount of public
trust that the inevitable higher proportion
of government involvement and popula-
tion targeting imposed by public health,
relative to other branches of health care,
are appropriate and in these various com-
munities’ best interests. Public health pro-
fessionals must go through the steps of an
ethics analysis to assure the public of their
integrity. The public must feel confident
that public health professionals will offer
only those proposals that will improve the
health of the public, that proposed mea-
sures are minimally burdensome, and that
a fair procedure has determined that the
magnitude of the problem and ensuing
benefits justify overriding the conflicting
moral claims. It is reasonable to assume
that the public will be concerned about
which functions are necessary and which
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ply wasteful. This process, then, must be
integrated, constant, and ongoing. The
most important asset that public health can
have is the public’s trust that work is being
done on its own behalf. In such a context,
public health professionals can and must
advocate for what they believe, on bal-
ance, are the ethically best approaches for
furthering social justice and the public’s
health.
PART 2: FRAMEWORK APPLIED
TO AVIAN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS
The following comments begin to
provide examples of how this framework
could be applied to avian flu. What fol-
lows is not an exhaustive analysis of the
ethics issues raised by a potential avian flu
pandemic, nor is it an exhaustive list of
how the framework provided here could
be used to help navigate the extraordinary
public health and ethics challenges such a
pandemic would precipitate. Rather, these
comments help to illustrate how the frame-
work might provide structure to thinking
through a sampling of ethics issues raised
by such a public health disaster.
Step 1. What are the goals of the pub-
lic health program or intervention?
A.At the most general level, the goals
of intervening in the face of an avian flu
pandemic are obvious: to reduce the mor-
bidity and mortality associated with the
epidemic. On the ground, however, more
specific goals must be identified, and the
realization of these will lead to somewhat
different courses of action and, in turn,
somewhat different ethics considerations.
One goal may be to reduce global inci-
dence of the disease and limit the spread of
the disease to the greatest extent possible.
An alternative goal may be to protect one’s
own citizens to the greatest extent possi-
ble, thereby minimizing morbidity and
mortality within one’s own borders.
Alternatively, the goal may be to maintain
as much of a society’s infrastructure
(either globally or nationally) as possible.
B. Articulating the overarching goals
of pandemic preparedness and response is
critical in order to design a plan of action.
However, it is in articulating the goal of an
avian flu preparedness and response effort
that one can examine the ethical ramifica-
tions of the response. While we all belong
to multiple communities, ranging from our
family to our country to the world, articu-
lating our overarching goals helps us to set
priorities about where our commitments
will be greatest.
Step 2. What are proposed interven-
tions? How effective are they at
achieving stated goals?
A. It is here that one must design a
plan of action. In the case of avian flu, the
plan would need to be very specific, delin-
eating who is provided with vaccines and
drugs, who must report for work, who
shall be isolated or quarantined, and what
types of data must be collected.
B. Once a plan of action is set, one
must then examine whether the plan of
action is likely to be effective in achieving
the overarching goal. One would need to
determine, for example, when isolation
would reasonably reduce spread and which
types of data are needed to improve the
response. Importantly, one must try to dis-
tinguish between sound, “hard” data rele-
vant to proposed interventions vs. logical
assumptions about what might be effective.
At the same time, much of the data one,
ideally, would have on hand will not be
available, and yet one will need to take
action. Ethics reminds us that the more
serious the public health threat, the better
justified we are imposing burdens, includ-
ing in the face of incomplete evidence.
C. One is always making an educated
guess, and yet the stakes could not be
higher. Non-governmental scientists as
well as non-political appointees with rele-
vant expertise must be included in devel-
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increase the evidence base with which
decisions can be made, but also to better
assure the public that decisions are scien-
tifically rather than politically motivated.
There may be appeals to the “precaution-
ary principle,” arguing that, when the fac-
tual underpinnings are insufficient to actu-
ally predict whether an action guide will
be successful, one can still invoke the plan
of action as a reasonable “precaution,”
since the consequences of not acting can
be so severe [31]. It is impossible to delin-
eate the amount or quality of data required
to justify a course of action. In the face of
heightened mortality, however, the public
will tolerate more restrictive measures,
especially if experience begins to demon-
strate that these measures are effective and
maintain some amount of order.
Step 3. What are the known or poten-
tial burdens of the program?
A. This step requires leaders to identi-
fy, in advance if possible, the burdens
associated with the approach they are
proposing. Who is disadvantaged and in
what ways are they disadvantaged? Most
significant will be threats to liberty due
directly to the various interventions
imposed. There likely will be restrictions
on travel, freedom to work, and freedom to
associate. These liberty restrictions may
be justified in terms of minimizing the
chance of epidemic spread, but they pose a
burden both psychologically and finan-
cially. There also will be threats to privacy
and confidentiality once names are put on
lists, contacts are traced, and the public
potentially can act on its interest in learn-
ing who is at risk and who has the disease.
Indeed, there is the potential for violent
reactions targeted to those known to be
vectors of a dangerous disease. There will
undoubtedly be “wrongs” to people — cit-
izens feeling violated for having names
publicly shared — as well as tangible
harms from disclosures of private infor-
mation.
Public health programs often carry
physical risks, and this is no exception.
Interventions like medicines and vaccines
will pose risks, although the public likely
will be clamoring for any of these avail-
able. There will certainly be those infected
in the line of duty. As above, public fear
may result in interpersonal violence, and
neighbors may further seek to deny need-
ed provisions to those they suspect or
know to already be ill. Finally, there will
be justice violations.At baseline, access to
health care, services, and a wide variety of
important privileges are inequitably dis-
tributed in the United States, and one can
predict that benefits and burdens associat-
ed with the response may inequitably be
distributed as well.
Step 4. Minimizing burdens and identi-
fying the least restrictive approach.
A. Burdens are inevitable, but they
must be minimized to the greatest extent
possible, without significantly altering the
impact of a response. One important and
effective means of minimizing the burden
of many interventions is transparency,
both in the preparation for and implemen-
tation of a pandemic response. The more
the public can be informed about what
avian influenza will look like, what strate-
gies likely will be used in a response, and
which interventions likely will unequally
target certain groups, the more the public
should be able to understand and, one
hopes, accept, the approach being taken.
Next, while it will be necessary to use and
disclose individuals’ names for certain
purposes, one must maintain the public
health commitment to disclosing names
only when necessary to fulfill a legitimate
public health purpose. Anticipating that
those who are isolated will have extraordi-
nary needs is critical. Identifying public
and private means of attending to require-
ments for food and communication will
minimize one of the most significant bur-
dens. Finally, questions inevitably emerge
in public health ethics around the question
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be voluntary or mandatory. While public
health is granted extraordinary authority
through its police powers to intervene
when necessary, this does not mean that
the most extreme response either is neces-
sary or appropriate in all situations, even
in the context of a public health crisis. It is
likely that the public will voluntarily com-
ply with many measures — particularly if
those measures seem reasonable to them
— out of their own fears of disease and
death.
Step 5. Is the program implemented
fairly? Is there justice in the distribution
of the plan’s burdens and benefits?
A. Step five of the framework asks
whether the response is implemented fair-
ly. There will be multiple ways that food,
medicines, and needed emergency person-
nel can be rationed and distributed. What
ethics requires, however, is that there is
some rational system for the distribution
of scarce resources and, more broadly, of
what are viewed as benefits and burdens of
the response. This system, then, should be
one that can be justified to the public. For
example, it is rational to impose travel and
immigration restrictions during a pandem-
ic response, while it is not rational to allow
extra burdens or discrimination on U.S.
residents whose national origin is the same
as the epicenter of the pandemic. Fairness
also requires consideration of compensa-
tion to those willing to come forward as
emergency responders.
Step 6. Fair procedures for creating a
preparedness plan and for implemen-
tation of a response.
A. During the response stage, one
should involve and educate multiple stake-
holders and should publicize in different
communities what response plans will
look like. How burdensome members of
the public view isolation, name-reporting,
or the inability to assemble with others,
however, will vary tremendously from
person to person. Some will think the gov-
ernment response is too harsh, while oth-
ers will view it as insufficient. Individuals
will care differently about the need to safe-
guard against discrimination. The goal of
involving the public — a form of proce-
dural justice — is not to reach consensus,
for consensus is impossible. Instead, this
involvement not only attends to trans-
parency — a critical duty out of both
respect and minimizing burdens, as above
— it also allows one to identify the source
of objections. While objections can be
anticipated, if they emerge systematically
from within a racial, age, or class group,
then it is necessary for public health pro-
fessionals to reexamine those pieces of
response plans. The interplay among
sociocultural and political considerations
within a response will be enormous. As
such, we must do our best to maintain
respect for the communities with whom
we interact. This means not only disclos-
ing information to them in ways they can
best understand, but also trying to orga-
nize different neighborhood groups to
work out their own response plans and
report back their conclusions. Further, one
can assume that involving the public will
allow public health professionals to better
refine their thinking, as considerations
likely will be raised that were not apparent
in their own planning.
In balancing competing preferences
and views, general ethics guidelines for
balancing benefits and burdens should be
followed. The greater the burdens imposed
on individuals, families, or communities,
the greater the need for transparency and
justification. Less burdensome interven-
tions often can be implemented without
prior public disclosure; heavily burden-
some interventions clearly cannot.
Conversely, the greater the external threat
to the public’s health, the lower the thresh-
old for intervening, imposing restrictions,
and delaying informing of the public.
While transparency, justification, and
accountability always are important, one
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certain emergency situations when it is
clear that threats are both imminent and
severe. At the same time, however, to the
extent that communicating the rationale
for one’s plan of action does not delay the
plan’s implementation, it always is impor-
tant, in terms of both respect and strategy,
to minimize burdens by providing the pub-
lic with information. The pre-pandemic
period is a critical time to engage the pub-
lic. By the time of a crisis response, dis-
closures or discussions simply may be
overruled out of expediency. Actions that
can be anticipated and discussed months in
advance may have the effect of minimiz-
ing how burdensome restrictive measures
are perceived to be by those on whom they
are imposed.
CONCLUSION
Public health ethics is intended to be
practical.Assuch,ethicsdemandsofusthat
we act now to work out plans of action and
consider questions of both harm and of fair-
ness in the preparation stage. The public
should be engaged now and pushed to con-
sider which responses are appropriate and
make sense. It is in our ethical best interest
to educate the public about public health,
how public health accomplishes its work,
and that the target group being protected is,
indeed, the public. To the extent that the
public currently takes for granted the daily
work of public health — for example in
maintaining a safe water supply, ensuring
restaurants are safe, and imposing restric-
tions on unsafe products — the public may
be less willing to accept interventions that
arecriticaltoachievingevensomeeffective
response in reducing the morbidity and
mortality of pandemic flu.
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